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COURT REPORTS

adjacent to the pond; Slusher petitioned for an administrative hearing
challenging the permit. The District denied Slusher's petition, and
Slusher appealed to the Florida Court of Appeals contending the
District should not have issued the permit due to the adverse effects
the well had on his pond.
Rule 40E-2.301 (1) (f) of the Florida Administrative Code ("Code")
requires a well applicant to give reasonable assurances that a proposed
water use will not interfere with presently existing legal uses. Section
1.8 of the Basis of Water Review for Water Use Applications within the
South Florida Water Management District ("Basis") defines "existing
legal use" of water as a water use that is authorized under a District
water use permit or is existing and exempt from permit requirements.
The District interpreted the last part of this definition to mean expressly
exempt from permit requirements. However, because the definition
of "existing legal use" was clear and unambiguous, the court
determined the District misconstrued its own rule by adding the
expressly requirement, and therefore did not give deference to the
District's interpretation.
Thus, because the District previously
conceded that no permit was necessary for the pond, Slusher's use of
the pond qualified as an existing legal use. Furthermore, no record
existed that Martin County gave any reasonable assurances that their
well would not interfere with Slusher's existing legal use.
The District further concluded that Section 3.6 of Basis-stating
that a well permit should be denied only if significant reduction in
water levels in an adjacent water body would occur to the extent that
the designed function is impaired-should also preclude Slusher from
relief. However, the original owner of the land provided undisputed
testimony that the pond's designed function was to raise fish.
Therefore, because the loss of the pond water impaired the designed
purpose of the pond, the court found that the District's argument that
the permit was properly issued was without merit. Thus, the court
reversed the District's decision to issue Martin County a permit to
operate a well because the District misinterpreted its own rules.
Aimee Wagstaff

GEORGIA
Gwinnett County v. Lake Lanier Ass'n, Nos. A03A2340, A03A2341,
A03A2342, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 63 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2004)
(holding (1) the Environmental Protection Division need not give
public notice after changes are made to a permit draft to release
highly treated wastewater into a lake, (2) the party challenging a
permit must affirmatively prove a violation of anti-degradation
regulations, and (3) the permit at issue was not invalid for failure to
require limits on mercury and properly limited effluent fecal coliform
and phosphorous).
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Gwinnett County ("Gwinnett")
applied
to the Georgia
Environmental Protection Division ("EPD") for a National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit to discharge highly
treated wastewater into Lake Lanier. The EPD gave public notice of
the permit application and allowed public comment on the permit
draft, which described the discharge location as near Buford Dam in
Lake Lanier. The EPD issued the permit to Gwinnett after revising the
discharge point to the North Advanced Water Reclamation Facility
("North Plant"). The North Plant discharged effluent near Buford
Dam into Lake Lanier. The EPD allowed no further public comment
on the revised permit before issuing the final permit.
An
administrative law judge ("ALJ") affirmed the EPD's issuance of the
permit after an evidentiary hearing. Lake Lanier Association, Terence
D. Hughey, Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc., and the
Sierra Club (collectively "Association") sought review of the ALJ's
decision in the Superior Court of Hall County. The court reversed the
ALJ's decision that the EPD must give additional public notice for the
revisions made to the original draft permit, and decided Gwinnett
must carry the burden of proving the absence of violations of antidegradation regulations. However, the trial court affirmed the ALJ's
rulings that the permit required no specific limits for mercury in the
effluent, and that the permit set proper limits on fecal coliform and
phosphorus.
Gwinnett appealed the reversals of the ALJ's decisions by the trial
court to the Georgia Court of Appeals. The court of appeals agreed
with the ALJ's decision that the EPD did not need to give new notice,
regarding the changes made to the permit draft before issuing the
NPDES permit. State regulations require the EPD to provide public
notice of the NPDES permit application with a period of public
comment before issuing the permit. The permit draft, issued in the
public notice, need only contain a general description of the discharge
point and the body of water absorbing the discharge. Here, the EPD
gave proper notice and accepted public comment. The court also
noted that state regulations allow the EPD to appropriately change or
revise the discharge point after the comment period without giving
additional notice. Therefore, the court of appeals found the EPD gave
sufficient public notice and reversed the trial court's decision
requiring additional notice.
The court of appeals also decided that the ALJ correctly found the
Association failed to prove violations of anti-degradation regulations.
State anti-degradation regulations require applicants for an NPDES
permit to demonstrate justification of water quality changes to the EPD
before the EPD issues the permit. Once the EPD issues the final
permit, any party challenging the permit must prove by a
preponderance of evidence that the permit holder failed to
demonstrate justification of water quality changes. The court held that
the trial court erred when it shifted the burden of proving whether a
violation of the regulations occurred from the Association to Gwinnett.
The court also held that the trial court erroneously substituted its
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judgment of the facts for the ALJ's judgment regarding whether a
violation of the anti-degradation regulations occurred. The ALJ's
decision must be upheld unless clearly erroneous, and the court held
that the ALJ made sufficient factual findings to support its ruling.
Therefore, the court reinstated the ALJ's finding that no violations of
the anti-degradation regulations occurred.
Next, the Association claimed the permit should include limits on
mercury. The court affirmed the trial court's decision not to require
limits for mercury in the permit, stating NPDES permits only limit
Specifically Gwinnett
pollutants that may possibly cause harm.
presented expert testimony at the ALJ hearing showing (1) no
mercury present in the influent coming into the treatment plant, (2)
the plant could reduce any mercury that may appear in the influent to
safe levels, and (3) if testing ever detected mercury in the effluent then
the EPD would impose mercury limits.
The Association also claimed that the limits for phosphorus and
fecal coliform would not protect Lake Lanier's designated uses of
swimming and fishing. The court held that the limits for phosphorus
and fecal coliform stipulated in the permit complied with all water
quality regulations, and the Association's claim lacked support by any
evidence in the record. Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court rulings concerning public notice and anti-degradation
regulations, and affirmed the trial court's findings relating to effluent
limits of mercury, phosphorus, and fecal coliform.
David B. Oakley

HAWAII
In re Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664 (Haw. 2004) (holding
although private commercial real estate developer's proposed
economic development plan constituted a "reasonable-beneficial"
water use, Commission on Water Resource Management properly
denied developer a water use permit pursuant to common law and
statutory authority).
The Department of Hawaiian Home Lands ("DHHL"), the Office
of Hawaiian Affairs, ("OHA"), and other individuals appealed directly
to the Supreme Court of Hawai'i, challenging a Commission on Water
Resource Management ("Commission") decision granting Wai'ola 0
Moloka'i ("Wai'ola") and its parent company Moloka'i Ranch, Ltd.
("MR") (collectively "MR-Wai'ola") a water use permit and authorizing
the Commission chairperson to issue well construction and pump
installation permits. DHHL, OHA, and the others argued (1) the
Commission erred in finding that MR-Wai'ola satisfied the requisite
conditions for obtaining a water permit for a "new use"; (2) the
Commission's decision violated the State's duty to protect DHHL's

